For almost two decades now, the security crisis in Nigeria has steadily intensified and spread throughout the country, terrorising its citizens, causing mass displacement and taking innocent lives. The reality of this conflict lies in its complexity and the multiplicity of actors involved.
Recently, on February 19, at least 50 people were killed, and others abducted in a northwestern village of Nigeria, in the state of Zamfara. Earlier that month, in the state of Kwara, gunmen killed over 170 people, razed homes and plundered shops, making it the deadliest attacks of the year yet. This situation has been going on for years, but has recently escalated as tensions and violence rise across the country. In 2021, the UN warned that over 1.1 million people could die before 2030.
These conflicts mostly differ by region and stem from long-standing ethno-religious tensions, governance failures, land pressure, and resource competition. Some argue that the centralised Nigerian government has failed to implement effective state police and has created space for non-state actors to seize control in under-governed areas of the country, notably in the Middle Belt and the northwest region.
On Monday, February 23rd, following President Trump’s call to action in November, the U.S. Congress delivered a report on Christian persecution in Nigeria, marking it the deadliest place to be for the practitioners. Indeed, the president launched airstrikes against the Islamic State terrorists on December 25th on account of a “Christian genocide”. Persecution against religious minorities accounts for a significant part of the hostilities, but purely framing this as the persecution of Christians overlooks the complexity of the conflict. Experts have concluded that all faiths have been victims of attacks, including Muslims who have not adhered to the Sharia law imposed in 12 of the 36 states. Shia groups have been victims of attacks, seen as non-conformist as opposed to the Sunni majority. These jihadist attacks are mostly carried out by Boko Haram or ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) in the northern regions, particularly in Borno, the epicentre of the repercussions, causing deaths and massive displacement. Since the 2009 insurgency led by the jihadist militant group Boko Haram, opposing the westernisation of Nigeria and Nigerian culture, the West African country has been dealing with persistent attacks and kidnappings, despite military offensives, creating a climate of instability and widespread insecurity.
Weaker state control has allowed for local conflicts to transform into organised violence. Notably, tensions over resources between pastoralist herders and sedentary farmers, especially Fulani herders, thereby reinforcing the conflict beyond mere competition over land and water, but also involving ethnic and religious divisions. The Fulani people, also known as Fulbe, are a West African ethnic group, composed of diverse communities. While some of them live a sedentary lifestyle and have settled, others continue to practice transhumant pastoralism and therefore move according to seasons. The tensions between the herders and farmers arose because of weak resource governance, but the two groups used to cooperate and have close ties. Policies often leave Fulbe marginalised and underrepresented, directly affecting their livelihood. Also, the absence of clearly defined land ownership exacerbates the disagreements, as the need for land for farmers intersects with the need of grazing routes for herders. In addition, poor climate conditions and the area’s desertification have worsened the situation. As a result of deep exclusion and restrictive land policies, both communities have carried out attacks and raids, destroying homes and forcing relocation. What started as local disputes became persistent, organised violence with a widespread use of weapons and the creation of militias.
Rooted in similar dynamics, bandit groups have spread throughout the northwestern and central parts of Nigeria. Indeed, as a spillover of the Boko Haram insurgency of 2011, ongoing insecurity and in part related to the herder-farmer conflict, organised criminal groups have rapidly formed in the regions. These gangs conduct mass kidnappings and often target schools in exchange for ransom, looking for easy and quick ways to make money, not known to be motivated by other political or religious ideologies. These “commercial criminals” operate in large numbers and often travel to neighbouring states, especially in remote forested areas difficult for the national police to access, imposing taxes on residents and installing a climate of fear. In November 2025, almost 250 students and 12 of their teachers were abducted in a Catholic school in Niger state, demonstrating growing unrest and the gradual control of criminal networks in certain regions.
Overall, this conflict remains highly complex, involving a range of criminal groups with differing motivations and varying across regions. The origins of this persistent violence are broad and multifaceted; however, as journalist Eromo Egbejule points out, “Nigeria’s original sin is ignoring the minorities and focusing on regime security”, thereby enabling “ideological criminals persecuting the religious, political and ethnic minorities and commercial criminals looking for money.”
By Laura Jacson
SOURCES
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g4jlgdyjdo
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria
https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/dont-call-it-farmer-herder-conflict/
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