By Lorenzo Valli
Shadowed by the mainstream conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the Third Sudanese Civil War has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced over 12 million people internally and in neighboring countries, according to the official statistics of the United Nations.
Before the 2026 UNGA, the Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated that “The level of suffering of the Sudanese people is intolerable”, and “there should be accountability for the kind of interference in which some countries provide weapons to parties, to a conflict, when those weapons are used massively to attack civilians”.
What countries was he referring to? Despite the absence of a decisive American role (limited to humanitarian aid, economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on both of the parties), the actors involved are multiple and each case deserves to be investigated individually.
The origin of the war
The origins of the war can be traced back to the fall of Omar Al Bashir’s thirty-year-old presidency in 2019, overthrown by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which gave birth to a very unstable transitional government toppled by SAF’s general Abdel al Burhan in 2021. Following these events, the only entity that the new leader had to suppress was the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a division evolved from the Janjaweed who were recruited by Bashir to bring down the Darfur Insurgency, during which they committed war crimes testified by the ICC. As a result of Al Burhan’s attempt to integrate the RSF in the state’s armed forces and reduce the power of its influential commander Muhammad Musa, known as “Hemedti”, the war broke out in April 2023 when the first clashes between the RSF and the SAF started in the capital Khartoum and its surroundings. The devastating urban battle of Khartoum lasted for 2 years till the SAF took full control of the city in May 2025.
As of today, the RSF controls the South Western region of Darfur, multiple parts of Kordofan and the corner between Sudan, Libya and Egypt.
The role of the United Arab Emirates
Undoubtedly, the most influential and militarily relevant foreign actor involved in the Sudanese war is the United Arab Emirates. Since the beginning of the conflict, it has been accused by multiple human rights associations, news agencies and the Sudanese government itself of arming and financing the RSF. A document elaborated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and released in September 2026 has officially recognized the massive role of the UAE: drones, artillery systems (NORINCO AH-4 howitzers, owned only by China and the UAE), air defence systems, armored vehicles and many more types of weapons were given to the RSF and allowed the rebel forces to continue the fight and reduce the aerial advantage of the government forces.
Additionally, it was reported that Abu Dhabi is organizing the transit routes of Colombian private contractors to Sudan and covering one of their main leaders.
After all of this clear and proven support, the most spontaneous question is: how does the UAE benefit from such manoeuvres?
First of all, it should be taken into consideration that Dubai is one of the greatest gold markets in the world and the Emirates depend exclusively on food import while Sudan has massive gold reserves and very vast fertile lands that the UAE lacks. Secondly, this strategy follows the broader Emirati support for anti-Islamist movements across the Middle East and Africa, that are usually sponsored by its greatest regional rival, Saudi Arabia, with which it contends for primacy in the region. As a matter of fact, Riyadh has condemned foreign interference in Sudan and the RSF while al Burhan is often considered an Islamist.
Chad, Puntland, Somaliland, Libya, Ethiopia and South Sudan
The UAE needs safe ways to transport military equipment and financial resources to the RSF which would be impossible without the support of multiple neighbors of Sudan. The same United Nations’ report affirms that the breakaway government of Benghazi in Libya, the autonomous states of Puntland and Somaliland in Somalia, N’Djamena’s government and Ethiopia have been fundamental logistical hubs for the Emirati weapons directed to Sudan.
All of these political entities have received funds and military equipment from Abu Dhabi which are crucial for their survival amidst their own civil wars or local insurgencies.
This explains why the RSF’s exclave along the border with Libya manages to resist despite its isolation from the rest of Hemedti’s territory and why Chad has denounced incursions from the SAF.
The Ethiopian case deserves a more detailed focus: the UAE and Ethiopia (both BRICS members) are close strategic partners and the substantial Emirati funds are fundamental for the heavily unstable Ethiopian ethnic federation. In exchange for the financial support, Addis Ababa’s government has directly intervened in favour of the RSF by allowing drones to be launched from its border with Sudan and training camps to be built inside its territory, as stated by numerous news agencies and the SAF themselves.
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that Ethiopia has accused the Sudanese government (alongside Egypt and Eritrea) of supporting the recent upheaval of ethnic military groups against Addis Ababa’s administration.
Additionally, the former rebel province of Sudan, South Sudan (born as an independent state in 2011 after two 20-year-long civil wars with Khartoum’s administration), is regarded as a paramount ally of the RSF which allowed combatants to join Hemedti’s army.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and Iran
Even before the signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the three members were aligned in the Sudanese conflict: Turkey is now the main supplier of weapons and training personnel of Al Burhan’s faction, mainly through the export of the famous Akıncı and Bayraktar drones that allowed the SAF to contrast the Emirati ones possessed by the RSF.
The expenses were partly covered by Saudi Arabia while Pakistan is said to be involved in a deal including jets and armoured vehicles.
This manoeuvre fits into the three powers’ strategic framework to support Islamist regimes in the region against the more secular movements allied with Abu Dhabi.
Somalia is said to have facilitated these transportations, although there isn’t full certainty on the matter.
Moreover, alongside the states previously listed, Egypt and Eritrea have been key allies for the SAF: both of these countries are strategic rivals of Ethiopia because of the Grand Renaissance Dam for Egypt and border disputes for Eritrea (gained independence from Addis Ababa in 1993).
Sudan’s northern neighbor has supplied Khartoum with weapons and ammunition while the other hosts SAF’s jets and troops in military bases.
Interestingly, another primary rival of the UAE has directly intervened in the war: the Iranian regime has supplied the SAF with drones (Mohajer-6) and other types of military equipment that turned out to be crucial for the SAF, especially in the capture of Khartoum.
Russia and Ukraine:
Since the full scale invasion of the country in 2022, Ukraine has extended its conflict with Russia to other parts of the world and Sudan is only one of these scenarios.
The Kremlin has always had a very ambiguous and opportunistic attitude towards the civil war: in order to have access to Darfur’s vast resources, its Wagner Group has supplied weapons to the RSF from their stronghold in the Central African Republic, where they have been crucial for the resistance of Bangui’s government against several rebel groups.
After the downfall of the Wagner Group in 2023, Russia focused on securing a naval base on the Red Sea in the city of Port Sudan but, despite the agreement signed with al Burhan in 2025, the constructions haven’t started yet and the projects are apparently frozen.
Because of this Russian involvement, Ukraine has sent its special forces to fight Wagner’s soldiers.
Conclusion
The recent UN report and reciprocal condemnations have only confirmed what news agencies and intelligence services have been describing for years: the Sudanese Civil War goes beyond the country’s borders and involves the majority of the states in the region. This major foreign intervention and interest is evidence of Sudan’s strategic importance and vast opportunities. Whatever the outcome, this conflict will be remembered as one of the bloodiest and most horrifying wars in our era.
References
https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-war-eritrea-sudan-egypt-6b3208122a4221f3c2e8dcbe21630016
https://rapidsupportforce.com/en/news-details/evidence-of-Egypt
https://sudantribune.com/article/305890